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MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1818

COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES

Nos. 15 and 16, August 1983

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COMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES

Nos. 15 and 16, August 1983

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language semimonthly journal KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, No. 15, August 1983, (signed to press 19 July 1983) and No. 16, August 1983 (signed to press 4 August 83).

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IN THE DISTRICTS, GROUPS OF FORCES AND FLEETS

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Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 15, Aug 83 (signed to press 19 Jul 83) pp 24-28

[Interview with Col V. S. Shenin, chief of directorate of Central Food Directorate, Soviet Ministry of Defense; date and place not given]

[Text] The first lines were inscribed in the chronicle of the military sovkhozes more than 60 years ago. The recording of this history began with a significant date. On 15 February 1919 Vladimir I1'ich Lenin signed the decree, "On the organization of state farms by institutions and associations of the industrial proletariat." On the basis of this document 174 military sovkhozes and 162 military kitchen gardens with a total sown area of 56,700 hectares were organized in the army and navy.

Decades have passed since then. The names and scales of development of the military sovkhozes have changed. But what remained unchanged was loyalty to the lofty goals which they serve—the providing of food for the soldiers' table and loyalty to the glorious traditions of the workers of the sovkhoz cornfields.

The tasks of the army and navy farms grew especially in light of the decisions of the May (1982) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Our correspondent recently met with the chief of directorate of the Central Food Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, Colonel V. S. Shenin. A talk took place on the work of the military sovkhozes and their contribution to the realization of the Food Program.

[Question] What is the place of the Armed Forces sovkhozes and subsidiary farms in the implementation of the Soviet Food Program?

[Answer] The Food Program and the problems raised in it pertain most directly to the work of the agricultural enterprises in the Soviet Armed Forces. After the May (1982) plenum of the Party Central Committee a session of the collegium of the Soviet Ministry of Defense was conducted. The tasks which follow from the Food Program were discussed at it. Just a little later a business-like

conversation also took place at a conference of leader personnel of the districts and fleets. All this permitted delving more deeply into the numerous problems which today worry the workers of the military sovkhozes and subsidiary farms.

The instructions of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, which he stated in a speech at the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, require us to regard with even greater attention the practical solution of the problems put forth by the Food Program. "It is especially necessary," he stressed, "to institute the uninterrupted supplying of the population with high-quality food products, in which regard, in such a way as to achieve the maximum possible self-provision in this regard." These requirements also pertain directly to the workers of the military sovkhozes. Making a notable contribution to the accomplishment of the Food Program, figuratively speaking they are assuming a portion of the state concerns on their shoulders.

There are many military sovkhozes in the districts and fleets. The majority of them are big, profitable farms with their own clear specialization and good traditions. Among the best are "Stepnoy," "Blagodatnyy" (Red Banner Kiev Military District), "Khmel'nitskiy," "L'vov" (Red Banner Carpathian Military District), "Burnenskiy" (Red Banner Central Asian Military District), and others. They serve as a good reference point for the other farms and teach how to attain more under approximately the same conditions. The constant turning to the experience of the foremost farms of the country which are represented in the agricultural pavilions of the VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy] of the USSR also provides us with much.

[Question] Any sovkhoz, of course, is strong with the selfless labor of its collective. But it is recalled that it was said at one of the conferences of agricultural workers: "As goes the director, so goes the sovkhoz. Ninety percent of the farm's success depends on him." Isn't this an exaggeration?

[Answer] Perhaps not. The director or chief is a prominent figure in the sov-khoz. He can be compared with full justification with the director of an orchestra. As Vladimir Il'ich Lenin wrote, he must have exact knowledge of who is playing what violin and where, where, how, and what instrument was learned and is being learned, who is playing out of tune where and why when the music begins to irritate the ear, and who should be transferred how and where to correct the dissonance.

The chief or director is on his feet and among the masses all day long. To manage a farm well means that one should know his business to the finest points and be an indefatigable organizer and skillful teacher of people. And he should succeed everywhere and set the needed tone in everything. Make a mistake—and in the orchestra the music begins to "irritate the ear." It is not without cause that in the Ukraine, for example, the chairman is extolled as the head.

We can name many leaders of sovkhozes who are working conscientiously, giving all their strength, and perceiving the Food Program as their own vital matter. Communist Senior Warrant Officer [praporshchik] B. Silyuk has headed difficult farms for several decades already. Where hasn't Boris Nikolayevich been—on Kamchatka and on Sakhalin. He works conscientiously everywhere, with deep

knowledge of the matter, and with a sense of party duty. Now the sovkhoz which he manages provides 16 million eggs and much other produce per year.

Communist Ivan Mikhaylovich Pribula "exchanged" a leading farm for one that was lagging behind. The "L'vovskiy" sovkhoz had not been lucky with directors: in a short time four of them were replaced. But here a real "conductor"—a reserve officer—led the farm up among those which now provide a substantial profit. The production of the "L'vovskiy" sovkhoz enjoys a good reputation among the Carpathian soldiers. On the table—tasty dishes from the sovkhoz beef, eggs....

[Question] But evidently is it not true that the most tale.nted leader does not work alone?

[Answer] It cannot be otherwise. He has many faithful assistants—communists and trade union and Komsomol activists. Their life is closely merged with cares about the land, a full—weight harvest, and a ponderable increase in weight on the livestock farms. The agendas of their meetings, bureau sessions, and committees are devoted to the most burning tasks of the sovkhoz workers. Recently, for example, I met the secretary of the party organization—Tat'yana Maksimovna Olizarenko. A person who is energetic, determined, thinks in the state manner, and worries with her heart about sovkhoz matters. And I can say firmly: there are such party leaders on the majority of the farms. I will name Peter Yegorovich Kaplunov, Nikolay Aleksandrovich Yatlov, and Vladimir Yefremovich Karpov. They are experts of agricultural production, indefatigable organizers, and concerned teachers of people. The Food Program clearly determined the goals for each worker of the fields and farms and each one understands they must be taken as rapidly as possible. And the communists provide an example in this.

[Question] You noted correctly: the workers in agriculture in the districts and in the fleets are striving to work better today than yesterday. It is not difficult to sense these attitudes when talking with the sovkhoz personnel. But people are also thinking of tomorrow. What basic directions in the development of agricultural production could be distinguished?

[Answer] They are well discussed in the Food Program. Each provision of this document also determines the paths for the development of the Armed Forces sov-khozes. Take the problem of the technical equipping of the farms. Much has been done. It will be no exaggeration to say that in almost any sovkhoz the equipment is maintained under good conditions, in specially equipped rooms. Timely repair work has been instituted here. The farms will receive much equipment in the 11th Five-Year Plan. However, the more difficult goals which the sovkhozes are to take require a more improved material base. This means that we should be wisely concerned about the further strengthening of the technical outfitting of the sovkhozes.

And the chemization and improvement of the lands, transportation problems, road construction, and social-living changes in the village? They worry us to the same degree as all workers of the fields and farms of our country. And how great is the significance of advanced science in agriculture. In short, the prospects for the development of the military sovkhozes are inseparable from state plans.

[Question] You spoke of the role of agricultural science in the rise of sov-khoz production. Can you detail this thought?

[Answer] Of course, without progressive scientific recommendations it is impossible to count on stable harvests, milk yields, and weight increases. The achievements of agricultural technology, leading experience, and promising varieties of agricultural crops and strains of livestock are being widely introduced into practice in the sovkhozes. Take any leading sovkhoz. It is leading because here the specialists look ahead and respond in a lively manner to all innovations in science. Mariya Kornilovna Semenova has been working for more than 15 years as the chief livestock expert in the "Il'ichevo" sovkhoz—an enthusiast, a person with creative search, and a propagandist of leading ideas in poultry raising. As a result, both the quantity and quality of the production is growing from year to year on this farm.

Much is being done to obtain high yields of agricultural crops thanks to a scientifically substantiated system of farming and with consideration of the natural and climate conditions in various regions of the country. In animal husbandry the thoughts of the scientists and specialists are directed toward the quality improvement of the livestock and toward fruitful breeding work and the rearing of the best strains of livestock. I will relate the following fact. A hybrid zebu is being created under Arctic conditions for the first time in world practice in the military sovkhoz of the Red Banner Northern Fleet. This animal is known not only by its record milk yields. Its milk is also distinguished by high bacteriacidal quality and resistance to microbes.

The recommendations of scientists are also well used for the solution of the feed problem of many sovkhozes. And this has tremendous significance.

[Question] Isn't one of the "secrets" of the leading farms, of course, economic work locally?

[Answer] Let me say that in any sovkhoz there is the corresponding service which lives not only with today's concerns. Experienced specialists look farther and think of its prospects. And to say it more simply, economists are constantly racking their brains: how to multiply the volume of production and how to raise its quality. The at first glance invisible battle for high harvests, milk yields, and weight additions is being waged by agronomists, livestock experts, engineers, and other specialists. They are all far from indifferent to whether one or another crop took root on the sovkhoz field, what strain of animals proved to be more productive, or why one or another agricultural technological experiment was not successful. And if there are such restive people on the farms, matters proceed successfully there.

I will tell especially about the daily assistance to agricultural workers on the part of military councils, commanders and political organs of the districts and fleets. I will be more precise: this support touches the most diverse aspects of sovkhoz life--production, ideological-educational and cultural-domestic.

[Question] In recent years, the brigade contract has received recognition among the country's agricultural workers. Does it have followers in military sovkhozes?

[Answer] Yes. Here, let us say, Hero of Socialist Labor and leader of the field-crop brigade, V. Yanovskiy, is gathering a grain harvest of at least 45-50 quintals per hectare on his sector. And meanwhile, Vladimir Romanovich's brigade consists of five men. The collective contract method helps to work successfully. On large areas the field-crop growers headed by their leader are accomplishing the entire complex of work, as they say, from sowing to gathering the harvest. The brigade receives compensation for the final result—the quantity and quality of produce raised and a reduction in its cost price. How was it formerly? With payment for the volume of work, each one was responsible only for his norm. He accomplished it—period. It was as if he had no interest in the remainder. The situation is different now: the earnings of the entire brigade are set depending on the harvest. People think first of all about the common success and strive not to let their comrades down and not to abandon the honor of the collective. In short, the brigade contract method is being firmly accepted by us.

[Question] In speaking about the work of the sovkhozes, evidently, shouldn't it be kept in mind that they are located under different conditions?

[Answer] Unquestionably. A correction for special natural features is unavoidable. Figuratively speaking, the specialization of the sovkhozes is legalized by life itself. And at the same time, I want to share the following thought: nature proposes and people dispose....

[Question] In this sense, Vitaliy Semenovich, do you not have several confirmations from your own experience?

[Answer] I do. I recall, in one of the Arctic military sovkhozes they could not raise the yield of potatoes for a long time. Then the leaders decided to consult with the local old residents and look for their "secrets." In essence, they delivered low-quality fertilizer to the sovkhoz fields--ashes from former salt works. Then they pretended: special seed is also needed. They turned with letters to the VDNKh [Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy] of the USSR, to the Priyekule station in Latvia, and to the Khibinskoye branch of the All-Union Institute of Plant Growing. They told the scientific associates about the special features of the sovkhoz soil and the periods of vegetation on the local fields. They helped our comrades--they sent the necessary planting material. The next year, the yield of potatoes was excellent--five times higher than the very record yield in this kray.

I will say more: they began to raise cucumbers here. They set up hothouses in low places. When the first harvest had ripened, the neighboring residents came here to see the "miracle" with their own eyes.

[Question] Probably, it will not be an error to say that the variety of the soldiers' table depends in no small measure on the efficiency of sovkhoz production.

[Answer] In general, this is correct. In the name of such a goal, tasks were also determined for our farms in the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans. The basic increase in agricultural production is envisioned in remote regions of the Far

East, the Far North and Central Asia. Here vegetable growing will receive a broad scale along with the development of livestock raising and poultry raising. There is a reason for this. It is no secret that today they still ship potatoes and vegetables to the east from the country's central regions. Estimate how much such transportation expenditures are.

And really, aren't such state problems as the safekeeping and high quality of the products of the fields and farms just as important for the military sov-khozes? Many storehouses are now being constructed for potatoes and vegetables as are points at which the fruits of labor of the grain growers and livestock raisers can be processed in time.

[Question] Of course, you do not add the Transbaykal and Siberia to the favorable agricultural regions....

[Answer] It goes without saying, conditions in the eastern regions are severe. Therefore, we are speaking of the development of meat and dairy livestock raising on an industrial basis locally.

[Question] And where will the feed come from?

[Answer] I agree, this is an acute problem. At times, there was also a loss of livestock due to a dearth of fodder. What is the way out? To strengthen the fodder base in the Transbaykal, it was decided to let one quarter of the areas lie fallow. It would appear that this is a contradiction: more feed crops cannot be obtained on less land. But such a crop rotation permits increasing the yield of grasses significantly, and this also means the total volume of feed procurements. They also considered popular experience. They decided to sow perennial grass here—Siberian wild rye. Its yield is very high as are its nutrient qualities.

The production of eggs on an industrial basis is rather promising in Siberia and the Transbaykal. Up to 20 million eggs per year can be obtained on the farms. Hog breeding is being developed on the "Tomskiy" and "Altayskiy" sovkhozes. Again: where will the feed come from? Potatoes and cheap grain are used here for this purpose.

[Question] Evidently, their vegetables, especially early ones, nevertheless will not be sufficient for the northerners.

[Answer] We also considered this circumstance. The production of early vegetable crops, and first of all onions, will be increased in the Central Asian and Turkestan Districts for those who serve in the areas of the Far North and the Far East.

In the Leningrad Military District and in the Northern Fleet we will develop the material-technical base of the sovkhozes, auxiliary farms, and special dairy farms so that the men have dairy products, eggs, and greens on their dinner tables.

[Question] In short, the leaders, specialists, and workers of the sovkhozes have many concerns in the current and subsequent five-year plans. Evidently, the auxiliary farms are also to capture important goals.

[Answer] They merit a special talk--objective and interesting. I should like to see on the pages of your journal an instructive article by a commander or political officer about the leading experience of auxiliary farms which at times are still called the little brothers of the sovkhozes. It is difficult to belittle their share of production in the food balance of units and subunits.

The auxiliary farms are advantageous in many respects. Large expenditures are not required for their creation. Transportation costs are almost excluded. Naturally, the role of the auxiliary farms will also increase in the future. Of course, they require considerable assistance from sovkhoz specialists who are armed with the latest knowledge and substantial practical experience. The development of personal auxiliary farms of the families of officers, warrant officers [praporshchik and michman], and workers and employees of the Soviet Armed Forces is also envisioned.

[Question] Of course, production problems are inseparable from social ones....

[Answer] Unquestionably, people do not live by bread alone. We have many sov-khozes which are millionaires. Public funds are constantly growing here, which permits constructing comfortable housing, schools, children's institutions, and clubs in the settlements.

The families of the workers live in comfortable private or sovkhoz houses. In the apartments—electricity, gas, hot and cold water, modern furniture, a television set, washing machine, and vacuum cleaner. Add to this: sovkhoz workers can rest with free trade union accomodations in sanatoria and holiday hotels and study in technical schools and institutes without separation from production.

[Question] Undoubtedly, the successes achieved by the military sovkhozes are ponderable. But, of course, are there also shortcomings in work to which special attention should be paid?

[Answer] Life is life, and it constantly places more and more difficult tasks before the agricultural workers. Prospects for the 11th and 12th Five-Year Plans proceed from the necessity to achieve greater intensification and efficiency in work and constantly increasing quality of production.

On specifically just what omissions should the attention of farm leaders and party, trade union, and Komsomol organizations be concentrated?

Economic work is still conducted poorly in a number of sovkhozes. What do I have in mind? Production capacities and material, labor, and financial resources are not always used efficiently. At times, a portion of the agricultural produce is lost unjustifiably. In individual sovkhozes, let us say, in the Transbaykal and in the Far East, a loss of livestock also occurs. Naturally, instances of mismanagement and carelessness cannot be tolerated.

Concern is also caused by violations of agricultural technology--negligent care of sowings and weediness of the fields. And take the use of equipment. On the whole, the matter is not bad. But is everything in order here? Alas, not everything. The efficiency of equipment is still not high on individual farms. At times it operates in one shift rather than in two. And this occurs in those places where there are not enough machine operators for the present and where they are not concerned about training them. Here is one more acute problem for you.

The state of affairs in agriculture, said Comrade Yu. V. Andropov at a conference of secretaries of Communist Party Central Committees of union republics and party kraykoms and obkoms, is still difficult for the present. But under these conditions, some workers look for and find ways to overcome difficulties and increase the production of agricultural produce while some try to justify serious omissions in their work by such conditions.

In following the requirements of the party, thousands of workers of military sovkhozes are filled with the resolve to make a notable contribution to the accomplishment of the Food Program and are striving to work better today than yesterday and to provide more quality produce for the soldiers' table.

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TRAINING OFFICERS TO DEMONSTRATE INDEPENDENCE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 15, Aug 83 (signed to press 19 Jul 83) pp 42-48

[Article by Capt 1st Rank M. Mayenkov: "Confirmed by Action"]

[Text] The striving for independence and self-assertion is an important feature of the human character. It is manifested actively from childhood to the years of maturity. But the striving for independence—is still not its essence, and not independence itself and it does not always become an attained goal. Far from always and far from by everyone.

Independence is almost the chief meaning of education. A child is watched over and supported so that later he can live and grow without being watched over and supported. And if this goal is rejected, a good and necessary matter is transformed into a harmful one with time, inflicting damage on education. It has long been known that an independent and responsible life can be taught only with the very same independence and in no other manner. This principle is also in effect in the more mature years: in school and institute, at production, in the military school, in the troop unit, and on the ship.

It is in effect! But do we always remember it, reckon with it, and do we always ponder over the entire complexity of molding the human character and its most important feature—independence and the ability to adopt important decisions and bear full responsibility for them? Unfortunately, not always.

An important stage in the molding of a young person—a future officer—are the years spent in school. Who will deny the fact that not only those become officer candidates who have already gotten to know the value of independence, are accustomed to it to a certain degree (although often far from in its best concept!), and are capable (again, to a certain degree!) of self—control, of the highly—responsible adoption of decisions, and of self—checking, but also youths who are constantly under their parents' guardianship and have not done anything in life for self—assertion. There are also those for whom instruction in the school and the future officer profession are extremely vague and its selection is a matter of pure chance. And together with professional knowledge they should all obtain the skills of independence and ability to think maturely and with perspective and to adopt decisions on which the fates of many people depend with all responsibility.

They should, but do they obtain them? If we speak in general, then—yes, they obtain them. And rather profound and firm skills. Otherwise, there would not be such convincing facts where the graduates of schools become good commanders and teachers in a short time and skillfully control subunits and ships.

In a talk with me, the commander of a ship spoke with great warmth about Senior Lieutenant V. Uritskiy. He praised him for initiative, persistence in attaining a goal, and performance. This officer participated in several long cruises and found himself in difficult situations where it was necessary to make responsible and, what is especially important, operational decisions. And each time he successfully accomplished his assigned duties and operated confidently and in a self-collected manner. And the majority of the officers on the ship are like this.

Of course, a sense of high responsibility and confidence in oneself based on profound knowledge of equipment, the ability to influence subordinates and to carry them along, and on ability are developed and strengthened in them in the school by the efforts of teachers, commanders, and political officers. It is they who were able to bring home to the future officers that without constant, selfless labor they can never become a genuine commander and teacher and cannot count on professional growth and advancement in service, and they were able to convince them that on a ship they should rely first of all on their own strength and concern themselves about the improvement of knowledge and the acquisition of experience. It is they who instilled in them responsibility for their own deeds and consciousness of the necessity to assert their authority in the collective by specific deeds. It is namely in the school that the future officer understood profoundly that independence has nothing in common with unsubstantiated self-confidence, with disregard toward what was acquired by the collective earlier, and that its basis consists of profound knowledge and constant striving for self-improvement.

To tell the truth, when you become acquainted with the activity of one or another officer you are amazed at first: how he copes with his most difficult duties, directs the collective, and makes independently important decisions on which the success in accomplishing training-combat missions depends—for he is still young! But when you observe this officer in work, you see how confidently and with knowledge of the matter he accomplishes his duties and the feeling of respect for him does not leave you. I would say—it is a feeling of sincere admiration and pride! Of course, you think with gratitude of those who instilled the necessary command qualities in him and taught him to think broadly, on a large scale, and in the state manner.

But nevertheless.... It is not so seldom that one can hear complaints that, they say, some young officers arrive from the school with good theoretical training and profound knowledge of their specialties but are poorly trained in independence and the ability to become oriented in a situation quickly and, in case of necessity, to take full responsibility. At times, this leads to where the period of the young officer's development is excessively protracted or, what is especially poor, causes a feeling of confusion and dissatisfaction in him.

Of course, such facts are undesirable, but they are encountered. And one cannot fail to consider them. In which regard, in each case one should approach a person attentively and with consideration of his individual features, character, and objective factors in order to draw correct conclusions for further practical actions. Really, let us say, one cannot fail to consider the circumstance that the transition from officer candidate to officer is an extremely difficult period psychologically, much more difficult than appears at first. glance. However it may be there and whatever the independence which was given to the officer candidate, in any situation he felt, knew, and was completely confident that next to him was the commander or teacher who, at any moment, interfere, help, and correct if necessary. And even if he makes a mistake in adopting a decision when accomplishing one mission or another, nothing dangerous will occur--with repetition he will be able to correct the error. The officer candidate seems to experience an inner freedom in the selection of decisions and a freedom from the necessity to subject his moral strength to serious test, for he does not bear full personal responsibility for the consequences but shares it (often not in equal measure!) with the teacher. I stress, this phenomenon is objective and it exists because the instruction process is impossible without recommendations and without the monitoring of the officer candidate on the part of the commander and teacher.

The very first days of service in a unit or on a ship are the period when the ability of the young officer to reorganize himself quickly from training under constant monitoring to training, primarily independent, from actions which are monitored by the teacher to such actions where he himself should make an estimate of what can be done and what cannot undergoes most serious tests. It is a difficult period. Each of the officers experienced it for himself. And the matter is not only that a tremendous burden of responsibility lies on the shoulders—this goes without saying. (Although namely great responsibility, as a rule, disciplines the officer and forces him to be more self-collected, serious, and purposeful.)

Let us ponder the words: "Oh what graduates these are!" Sometimes, such words are uttered with a sigh, expressing one's dissatisfaction with the activity of a young officer. Not anybody—commanders! Often rather experienced.

Of course, one can argue with such a commander and object to him that, they say, the school trains the officer both theoretically and practically at the level necessary to direct the subunit and train and indoctrinate subordinates. But he, the commander, must be concerned about how rapidly the newcomer will be assimilated in the collective, will occupy a worthy place in it, will gain experience in work, and will acquire the skills of genuine independence. And not only he, but also the political officer and the party and Komsomol organizations. But, you see, another commander can and should be understood. He sighs, not because of a good life, not because of a whim, and not from excess captiousness. It means, let us say directly, they he did not encounter the best young officer, not one who was accustomed to assert himself in life by deed and work and for whom service, excellent service, is a goal in life.

It can be understood. But it does not become better because of this and the matter does not correct itself. There is only one single way out--not to complain

about someone and not to hunt out flaws in the upbringing of a person which were committed by someone, but to proceed from the fact that the young officer is to live and serve here and that his practical activity begins in the unit and, rolling up the sleeves and setting to work, undertake the matter, continue to instill in him persistently the necessary qualities, teach, teach, and teach, and instill knowledge and experience in him.

"Each year many young officers come to our ship," related Captain 2d Rank Lev Stepanovich Yevdokimov. "Different people. In turn of character, and in knowledge of equipment and weapons, and in skills in working with subordinates, and in the ability to control oneself and one's feelings, and in the ability for self-evaluation. It is sufficient to suggest to one where he should begin work and to what special attention should be turned, and the officer begins to grow rapidly both as a specialist and as a teacher. More painstaking work is needed with another. Of course, some commanders do not want to trouble themselves with unnecessary work and spend time and effort on searches for the most effective forms and methods for indoctrinating a subordinate. It is much easier to sigh and become outraged concerning the insufficient state of training, activity, and efficiency of a young officer and to accuse him of irresponsibility and insufficient understanding of his duty! The most useless occupation is to call to duty a person who does not have a sufficient sense of duty and in whom it has not been instilled and to require what was not given to him and what he was not able to learn. Figuratively speaking: they didn't sow, but they arrived with a harvester. And if one wants very much to gather the harvest, he must sow first of all and raise the plant with love...."

The reasonings of the ship's commander are extremely substantial, for they are based on an analysis of the specific activity and indoctrinational work to which he devoted many years. With his direct assistance and under his influence many former graduates of schools, to each of which he gave a particle of his heart, became experienced officer-leaders of various ranks. The officer not only makes skillful use of the established forms of indoctrinational work with people, but also on the basis of great teaching experience and a profound knowledge of life, ship's service, and psychology of young officers he improves and enriches them.

Do not require of a person what he has not yet learned—otherwise you will create a conflict situation yourself... Give the young officer the opportunity to perform his duties in such a way that he feels satisfaction from his work and experiences inspiration from the fact that he is occupied by a matter which is necessary and useful not only for himself, but also for others....Respecting the officer's striving for independence, attain his absolute execution of your requirements.... Desiring something for a subordinate, think of whether he would desire it for himself....

It was possible to mention still another series of pedagogical precepts, as he himself says, which Yevdokimov follows strictly in work with young officers. And chief among them are: the display of personal example literally in everything, self-control and tact, demandingness and concern.... Briefly, everything which the commander and teacher must possess and with which it is necessary to be guided in the training and indoctrination of people.

Yevdokimov, just as any other commander, had the occasion to work with the most diverse graduates of schools: with those who, as they say, are quick to learn, and with "difficult" people who have serious gaps in knowledge and in discipline and a difficult nature. But he always saw before him primarily a young person. And already the very word "youth" will be our notion of the lofty spiritual impulses, aspirations, and daring. Youth—the time of inexhaustible creative forces and the desire to prove oneself in life with good deeds. The young years—this is the period when energy splashes over the edge and any matter seems within one's power and any goals seem to be attainable. But this is also the time when the character and a life's position are molded and the cause is determined to which years of strained labor will be given. And if this is so, then the maximum attention, wisdom, and concern are required of him, the commander and teacher, so that this molding proceeds along the required channel and in the correct direction.

Lieutenant Ye. Kanevskiy arrived on the ship at a busy time—a long cruise was to take place. And the group which he headed was not one of the easy groups. Just how would the lieutenant conduct himself? This question worried Yevdokimov; he attentively looked at the young officer, visited his place of work quite often, and did not miss the opportunity to talk with the lieutenant's subordinates and for him himself to tell how better to organize independent training and share experience in the study of equipment. And he did this naturally, without pressure, gradually stimulating the person to activity. Kanevskiy, reassured by such attention and having a clear notion of how to attain what goal, worked with such energy and such diligence that sometimes it was even necessary to restrain him and convince him that strained labor must be combined with good rest. And so the development of the young officer took place in such a situation. And soon they began to speak of him in the collective as an extremely serious, thoughtful, and knowledgeable specialist.

One day Yevdokimov inquired of the department commander as to his opinion of the lieutenant. And he heard in response:

"Those such as Kanevskiy confirm their good reputation by action. Deeds, successes—they are the best testimonial for him."

Confirmation by action.... There is no more direct path toward the attainment of a lofty goal and there is nothing more difficult than it. Any attempt to simplify this path or to turn away from it and to replace practical actions by talks about duty leads to sad consequences. By the way, Yevdokimov also considered the inner readiness of a young officer for growth and for improvement to be the first condition for successful development. And here the pedagogical efforts of senior comrades bore a preventive, regulating, and toning-up nature. But there were also cases a little more difficult.

Nothing hampered a young officer, N. Gubov, in successfully accomplishing his duties and seeing that the collective which he headed occupied the leading place on the ship. Nothing! He was not inferior to other young officers in abilities as well as in the level of theoretical and practical training. And the conditions for self-assertion, the acquisition of new professional knowledge, enrichment with experience, and improvement of skills in indoctrinational work were identical. The difference existed in the main thing—in the degree of

purposefulness and desire to undertake a matter with all responsibility from the first days, and in the depth of understanding of the meaning of honest, conscientious labor. And if everything proceeded for Gubov at once, as they say, in an oblique manner, and if he was unable to concentrate attention on the main thing—on selfless labor and on the study of equipment, and he did not want to place himself within the strict framework of prescribed order, then he himself is guilty here first of all. Indiscipline, reluctance to trouble himself with concerns, and the striving to live in accordance with the principle "if only the day was over" ultimately gave the senior commanders the basis to draw the conclusion that the officer "does not pull." But it is one thing to record a fact, and another to struggle to the end for a person. Unfortunately, no genuine struggle for the young officer was waged on the ship where he began his service; they tried to get rid of him more quickly—they transferred Gubov to another collective.

When Yevdokimov became acquainted with him, he immediately understood that long and painstaking work was ahead requiring persistence, tact, pedagogical skill, and coordination of the actions of many communists. Yes, serious errors were committed earlier in the upbringing of the young officer. At what stage—now it was already difficult to determine. Perhaps, while still in school, perhaps on the ship where the officer began service. But the essence is not in this, but in the fact that he was not accustomed to independence, was not able to control his actions, and was not imbued with responsibility for them. It turned out that it was necessary to correct the errors. Sometimes, this is more difficult than beginning the education of a person, as they say, with a clean slate. Not to look for various pretexts to get rid of a young officer!

This is approximately how the experienced commander reasoned and this is approximately what he said to the political officer and other officers of the ship, and he recommended to them how better to approach the newcomer and which aspects to consider.

Subsequently, Yevdokimov himself was an example in this. He helped his subordinate to draw up a detailed plan for the independent study of the equipment, told him what tasks the ship and each officer were to accomplish and on what special attention should be concentrated, and he warned that his authority in the collective and success in further service depend to a great extent on the persistence and diligence with which the lieutenant will regard the assigned matter and how active he becomes in public life. The commander also said that Gubov can count on the assistance of any officer on the ship and that mutual assistance is a tradition in the collective.

Assigning a specific mission, the commander then systematically checked on how precisely it is being accomplished, how much of what had been planned had been done, and where errors had been made. A detailed critique and analysis of actions and deeds helped the young officer to move toward the goal more confidently. In addition, he saw that the commander and other officers were not paralyzing his initiative and not reproaching him with the past but were granting sufficient freedom of choice in the solution of problems of special training, supporting the striving for creativity, and regarded approvingly attempts to display independence here.

"It was a difficult period," Yevdokimov recalls. "Successes alternated with failures, mistakes, and grief. At one moment everything proceeded as it should, and we were inclined to think that the goal had been attained, and suddenly again failure. I often met with the deputy commander for political affairs, the commander of the department, and the secretaries of the party and Komsomol organizations, and we decided what should happen next..."

And what happened next was what happens on each ship and in each unit where all the communists consider themselves responsible for the fate of the person. There were heart-to-heart talks and talks at officers' meetings, after which the thought cannot help but arise in the person: "How did I come to such a life?", and there were joint lessons with experienced specialists. In short, there was patience multiplied by labor. And this could not help but provide good shoots.

The senior comrades understood: what is happening to Gubov is what happens not so rarely at his age. Really, don't we encounter cases where, it would appear, an ardent adherent of the sea who has dreamed of sea service suddenly begins to state that he made an erroneous choice and that the fate of the seaman is not at all his fate? For it is namely by this that some young officers try to justify their "arts." Formerly, having lost the true way, they find nothing better, than to assert that allegedly the entire matter is that military service is not their calling. And later, when they acquire knowledge and skills in work as well as responsibility with the aid of the commander and their comrades nevertheless, you look and the calling and love for the assigned matter come. Some later recall this period of "indefiniteness" with shame.

It goes without saying that the moral-psychological attitude means much in determining how the start of a young officer's service will be, and then its continuation. But this attitude depends, as has already been noted, not only on his personal qualities and not only on with what store of knowledge and horizon and with what conviction in the importance of the selected cause the officer arrives from the school. The attitude is also determined by the situation in which he finds himself from the first days of service in the unit or on the ship, by the attitude toward him not only of the responsible officials but also of each member of the collective, and by that mutual understanding, good will, and atmosphere of exactingness and attentiveness which invariably help the development of a person. But can a young officer always land in a situation, contact with which alone provides a charge of cheerfulness and optimism and intensifies the desire to work with the full output of strength? At the beginning of his life's path does he always meet a commander such as Yevdokimov who perceives both the joy and pain of his fellow serviceman as his very own and who grieves for the fate of his subordinate as for the fate of his own son? Does the young officer always find the understanding and assistance of his senior comrades at a joyous moment and at time of failures. And finally, does he always see in them an example of honesty, devotion to principle, and a selfless attitude toward a matter? Unfortunately, not always.

Letters reach the editors in which young officers share their thoughts and reflections on military duty and honor and tell how their service began, what they like and what is unsatisfactory, and how they picture their future. They are interesting letters. Becoming acquainted with them, you mentally see before you

people with a fervent heart and with a lofty dream who can overcome any difficulties in the struggle to attain the goal which they have set for themselves. You also see those who are going alongside them, tactfully and skillfully helping them to acquire wisdom—worldly, military, and pedagogical, and those who give them a particle of their hearts—commanders, political officers, and senior comrades. You see and gain access to them with respect and you believe that they will grow and bring up genuine defenders of the motherland.

But once in a while, you become acquainted with a letter which smells of bitterness and resentment and in which in each line, if one can express it this way, there is a cry from the heart. You read such letters with pain and you think with pain of how some leaders regard the upbringing of young officers with such inexcusable lightness and of the tremendous loss which they inflict by their actions not only on the subunit and unit, but also (we are not afraid of generalizations!) on the Armed Forces.

Here is a letter from Senior Lieutenant Anatoliy Aleksandrovich Shakhov. He certifies that he arrived in the unit with the fervent desire to give all his strength to the assigned matter and to prove with stubborn work that he can become a good officer. Naturally, he encountered difficulties at first but he tried as best he could to overcome them. But, as the author writes, neither his efforts nor the effort of other young officers were noted in the unit. Moreover, their service zeal was not always supported. Here, they were not concerned, either, about the elementary conditions necessary for normal training, living, and rest.

It is clear to everyone with what a poor attitude people who are greeted with indifference, coarseness, and distrust instead of comradely participation in their deeds and concerns and instead of specific assistance from day to day perform their difficult duties. It is even worse if, from day to day, they encounter examples of unconscientiousness, violations of the requirements of the regulations, and a lack of demandingness on the part of senior comrades. Should one be surprised if some young officers throw down their hands and in some the thought appears that their labor and effort are not evaluated at their true worth? For you see, each of them heard absolutely different words in school many times: "They are waiting for you in the units, they will help you to acquire experience in a short time, and the main thing—try yourself." And they hoped, tried, and are trying. But resentment lives because reality proved to be different from the way it was presented.

There are different attitudes of commanders toward the training and indoctrination of young officers and, naturally, different results in the development of those who are beginning their difficult service path. And really, can it be otherwise? No, it cannot. Their future begins with the attention and concern and with the pedagogical wisdom of the commander and his fatherly attitude toward his subordinates. That is how it was, is, and will be.

But we cannot pass over in silence the fact that not every commander possesses sufficient experience and knowledge of work with young officers. Errors are committed not because he underestimates this matter, but simply does not know how he should accomplish it. And if more experienced comrades point out omissions

and advise how to proceed better and on what to concentrate main attention, you look and the situation straightens itself out. It is worse when errors remain unnoticed and are raised to the rank of a "normal condition"—they gradually grow and, as a rule, lead to serious omissions in indoctrinational work.

Of course, it is surprising if the commander commits an error in work with young officers and does not receive an evaluation based on principle from the appropriate persons. But it is no less surprising if the party organization also does not adopt effective measures to eliminate shortcomings in work with young officers and does not display activity and persistence in the struggle to create the proper atmosphere and a situation of mutual respect and mutual demandingness in the collective. Its duty is to support the young officers, encourage them, and hold strictly accountable those who have a disrespectful attitude toward the junior comrades.... In short, it should adopt all measures so that the officers can accomplish their duties with desire and have every opportunity to grow and improve in the political, military, and moral plane. But, unfortunately, several party organizations do not always display resoluteness in this important matter.

We are absolutely sound in linking the combat readiness of the Armed Forces with the training and indoctrination of young officers and with the development of lofty professional, military, and ideological-political qualities in them. But this link cannot exist conditionally and theoretically; it requires practical actions, the persistent introduction of the most effective forms and methods for influencing people into practice, and ensuring the unity of ideological-political, military, and moral indoctrination.

Genuine, interested concern for people—their professional training, ideological tempering, expansion of their cultural horizon, living conditions, and rest—always were and are at the center of attention of our Communist Party. This was confirmed with new force by the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. In its documents, the thought lies that the main role in the successful accomplishment of any difficult tasks belongs to man—the active builder of communism, creator, and toiler, and concern for him is the concern for the beautiful future of our motherland. One should also proceed from this in work with young officers. Concern for them is concern for the future of the Soviet Armed Forces.

As experience shows, the highest results in the training and indoctrination of young officers are attained in those units and subunits and on those ships where the efforts of commanders in this direction are reinforced by the persistent, purposeful work of political organs and party and Komsomol organizations. A close correlation exists here.

Let us say, on the ship which was being discussed, at their meetings the communists often made a profound and comprehensive analysis of the work with young officers and the activity of each of them, generalized the experience of the best commanders and teachers, held strictly accountable those who regarded the newcomers scornfully, and gave them assistance. Naturally, such an approach to the matter raised the responsibility of all those who had something to do with the training and indoctrination of young officers. Also, personnel of the political department, being on the ships, invariably were interested in what attention is devoted to the recent graduates of the schools, what they need,

and how their development is proceeding. And all this, taken together, created an environment of general interest in the training of young officers, to which they responded with conscientious labor.

You don't say this about the collective in which Senior Lieutenant Shakhov serves. Both the party organization and the political organ could not fail to know that the young officers here, to put it mildly, feel uncomfortable, saw that their interference is necessary, but undertook no measures. It was as if it never occurred to some leaders that to be concerned about the training and indoctrination of young officers and their living conditions and rest is one of the very first tasks.

When we speak of the necessity of each officer to assert himself and his authority in the collective by practical actions, industriousness, and activity from his first days of service in the unit or on the ship, we invariably presume that for this the appropriate conditions will be created for him, that lofty demands will be imposed on the officer, and at the same time they will manifest maximum concern for him. Only in this way and in none other. In such an important and responsible matter one should operate in a well thought out manner, with high responsibility, and in a pedagogically competent manner—so that each young officer, having begun service in the unit or on the ship, does not doubt for a minute: he will not only become a master of his trade and a full and equal member of the collective, but also a commander and teacher who is an example of selfless service to his fatherland.

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POLITICAL TRAINING FOR NON-RUSSIANS IN MILITARY CONSTRUCTION UNITS

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[Article by Col Gen V. Bychenko, Chief of Political Directorate, military construction units: "Our Priceless Property"]

[Text] The monolithic solidarity of the Soviet people comprises one of the decisive factors in the constantly growing might of the Soviet Union. The friendship of the Soviet peoples—our priceless property—has become that great force which makes practicable the most grandiose plans for the economic, social, and cultural progress of the country and guarantees the reliable ensuring of its security.

Questions of strengthening the brotherhood and the multinational Soviet family are constantly at the center of our party's attention. The importance of this work was again stressed by the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Giving a speech at the plenum, comrade Yu. V. Andropov noted that "the perfection of developed socialism must include a well thought out, scientifically substantiated national policy. At its basis are the principles bequeathed to us by Lenin: the complete equality of rights of all nations and nationalities of the country, the freedom for their development within the framework of the fraternal union, and the steady course toward their drawing together. The implementation of this policy requires and in the future will require the consistent indoctrination of all Soviet people in a spirit of socialist internationalism and deep consciousness of the community of interests of all peoples of the Soviet Union."

The Soviet Armed Forces are the creation of the Soviet people. The Armed Forces are the embodiment of the Lenin principles of national policy in the military sphere, and service in them is a genuine school for the indoctrination of the personnel in a spirit of friendship of peoples and Soviet patriotism and internationalism.

The Political Directorate of the military construction units and our political organs receive many letters from military builders who have been released to the reserve with the expression of sincere gratitude for science and the school of life, labor, and comradeship. Here is one of them which arrived from Tbilisi from Senior Sergeant (reserve) Temuri Bernashvili. "I was released to the

reserve more than a year ago," he reports. "I now have new matters and concerns. But I often recall my service and my company commander, Senior Lieutenant Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Kushnin. Thanks to the commander and the entire tenor of army life, we became skilled soldiers during the two years of service and understood the value of military comradeship."

Forming the basis of the work on indoctrinating the personnel in the spirit of the friendship and brotherhood of the Soviet peoples, the significance of which in the present difficult international situation is growing even more, is the profound study, by all categories of personnel, of the party's Leninist national policy, the conclusions of the 26th CPSU Congress concerning the development of national relations under conditions of mature socialism, the report by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, "Sixty Years of the USSR," the materials of the November (1982) and June (1983) plenums of the party's Central Committee, and the instructions of the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, on the necessity to maintain in the troop collectives an atmosphere of comradeship and brotherhood and to instill in the men a proud sense of belonging to the single great Soviet motherland.

The law of the USSR, "On the labor collectives and raising their role in the control of enterprises, institutions, and organizations," which was adopted by the 8th session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 10th convocation, has become a great help in the accomplishment of these tasks under the conditions of the military construction units.

The political directorate orients personnel toward a more profound approach to questions of national relations and, as required by the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the attentive study of the specific interests and special features of national psychology and culture. We are giving great attention to the training of personnel for work in multinational collectives. Jointly with the Institute of Military History of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, the Political Directorate of the military construction units conducted a scientificpractical conference, "Fraternal friendship of the Soviet peoples--the source of the might of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces." The report and presentations of commanders and political officers disclosed profoundly the role of the CPSU in the formation of the USSR and showed the triumph of the party's Leninist national policy and the contribution of the 26th CPSU Congress to the development of national relations at the contemporary stage of communist construction. The participants in the conference thoroughly examined questions of work practice of commanders, political organs, and party organizations in strengthening friendship, and the solidarity of the multinational collectives of military builders and the mobilization of the personnel for the successful accomplishment of missions of capital construction.

The Political Directorate also supplemented the training plans for the professional training of the officer personnel, including in them urgent questions of the theory and practice, procedure, and organization of international indoctrination.

In propagandizing the party's decisions on national questions, official and unofficial lecturers and members of agitprop collectives and speakers' groups are making a ponderable contribution. To assist the propagandists, the Political Directorate prepared and sent to the political organs methodological elaborations, reviews, recommendations, and materials for lectures and reports. Now, of the total number of lectures 30 percent are devoted to problems in rallying the collectives.

Commanders of companies and detachments and their deputies for political affairs are occupied in seminars on work practice in multinational collectives. The officer personnel are oriented on the conduct of those measures which would instill in the personnel a deep realization of the importance of friendship and brotherhood of peoples as one of the sources of the strength and might of the USSR and would mold in each serviceman a lofty style of international intercourse and a feeling of pride for our Soviet motherland. These goals are well served by planned political training conducted in the units, common days of political training, Lenin and socio-political readings, lectures, reports, talks, soirees devoted to achievements in communist construction by the union republics, cinema-lecture soirees, "In a Single Family," "My Motherland—the USSR," and "We Are Patriots—Internationalists," special—purpose political information sessions, and excursions to museums of combat and labor glory of construction organs and units.

For example, a meeting with veterans of military construction left a deep trace in the hearts of the youth of one of the units. Engineer-Lieutenant General M. Klimov, Engineer-Lieutenant General (retired) M. Grigorenko, Engineer-Colonel (retired) A. Makarov, and others appeared before the personnel. They shared their recollections about the past war and about the heroic exploits of the military builders of our country's many nationalities who, under enemy fire, constructed defensive lines and actively supported the offensive and defensive operations of the Soviet Army. The participants in the meeting were greeted by Hero of Socialist Labor, winner of the Lenin Prize, and honored builder of the RSFSR V. Lyakhov and by pilot-cosmonaut of the USSR and Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel V. Lazarev. An appeal of the veterans to the personnel of the military construction units was adopted at the meeting.

Cultural and educational institutions are conducting important work on international indoctrination. Thematic and literary-artistic soirees, debates, and meetings with interesting people are organized on the initiative of club and library councils. Thus, in the unit where Captain S. Gromoslavskiy is the propagandist, a reference-information center has been created with the club, necessary literature on the union republics has been collected, and there are a subject catalog, "What to read on friendship and comradeship?" and a card file of newspaper and journal articles, motion picture films, and film strips on subjects of friendship of the Soviet peoples. Recently, for example, a thematic soiree, "Friendship of the servicemen-builders--the guarantee of the successful accomplishment of production plans," took place here. Colorfully prepared displays acquainted the participants in the soiree with the achievements of the union republics, their leading people, and heroes of war and labor. The military builders conducted a thorough talk on the friendship of the Soviet people and its significance for the accomplishment of creative tasks and the strengthening of the country's defense.

The center of ideological-indoctrinational work, an important role in which is allotted to the strengthening of friendship between men of different nationalities,

is the company. It is namely here that the baton of ideological-political, labor, moral, and physical upbringing of the youths who have entered the army formation is accepted from the family, school, or labor collective. It is namely here that the youth passes through the school of soldierly skill, of maturing, military friendship, comradeship, and mutual assistance. And the more successfully this school is passed through, the more thoughtfully will commanders, political officers, and party and Komsomol organizations structure indoctrinational work in the subunits.

The activity of many of them is distinguished by a creative, business-like style and the striving constantly to enrich with deep meaning the content of each measure in the indoctrination of the military builders in a spirit of friendship of peoples and the unity of the multinational collectives. The communists and Komsomol activists are directing their efforts toward enriching the spiritual life of the men, subordinating it to lofty aspirations, and eliminating any deviations from the standards of communist morals and morality.

Instructive in this plane is the activity of the party and Komsomol organizations of the subunit where officer A. Chaus is the political officer. Here, great individual work is conducted with the men who have mastered the Russian language poorly. Communists and Komsomol activists first ascertain the vocabulary of each of them and determine who of the soldiers and sergeants can render assistance to their comrades in the study of the Russian language. On lessons, such men are granted the opportunity to speak more often, their first successes are noted and evaluated favorably, and any attempts at displaying irony toward them are decisively suppressed. In the company, talks are conducted regularly on the party's Leninist national policy, on the Russian language—the language of friendship and brotherhood of the Soviet peoples, and on the increase of its role in international intercourse at the stage of developed socialism, and soirees, "At the map of the motherland," are organized where men of different nationalities tell about the successes of their republics in the building of communism.

The great creative friendship of the fraternal peoples was also discussed on "The matinee of the parent's letter," in the preparation and conduct of which almost all the military builders of the company participated.

Unfortunately, such an approach to the matter is not encountered everywhere for the present. In some subunits individual measures are conducted formally, the achievements of men of different nationalities are not popularized in the proper manner, and strict demands are not imposed on those who do not value the title of military builder and display national conceit.

It is the duty of commanders and political workers and party and Komsomol activists to do everything so that each measure conducted is closely linked with life and with the missions being accomplished by the military construction units. Ideological work in this plane should be accomplished in the direction of a deeper penetration into the processes which are occurring in the multinational collectives and the traditions, customs, and national-psychological features of the men should be considered more completely in daily work.

It is known, for example, that the peoples of the Transcaucasus and the Central Asian and other republics of our country have good traditions. Take even the special deference of juniors to seniors or, let us assume, the uniquely exalted notion of male honor and personal dignity. Relying wisely on these and other distinguishing features in the national character of people, one can accomplish better and with better results the tasks in the indoctrination of the personnel and the rallying of the collective and achieve high results in labor and discipline. We have hundreds of leading brigades which are multinational in their composition which have attained high production indices on the basis of well thought out work by party and Komsomol organizations.

Here, for example, is the multinational brigade of Hero of Socialist Labor and State Prize winner I. Savotikov. During the years of the 10th and two years of the 11th Five-Year Plans the brigade accomplished construction-assembly work worth 17 million rubles. The brigade has been working on the cost-accounting basis for 10 years and bears the title, "Collective of Communist Labor."

Purposeful ideological-indoctrinational work is typical of this collective. It is structured with consideration of the national-psychological features, life's experience, professional training, and labor tempering of the brigade members. Emphasis is placed on the molding of collective qualities in the course of joint labor. It has become a rule in the brigade: each experienced specialist looks after a young one. Many efforts in the training of the young replacements are applied by squad leader Junior Sergeant V. Kisilev and military builders T. Karabalev, M. Khamidullin, and the brothers A. and S. Chaush-ogly. The initiative of the country's leading builders, "Not one laggard alongside," is being embodied there in practical deeds. Kindness, a feeling of fellowship, and sympathy are valued highly. Diligence is always noted, and it is discussed at the daily summing up of results. The names of the shock workers of the day and week and of the best according to the monthly results are entered on the "Screen of the Competition."

Consideration of the national-psychological features of the personnel is also the manifestation of daily concern for the personnel. The military builders must work at any time of the day and in various climate conditions where frequently there is no previously prepared available housing or barracks and the natural difficulties of pioneers occur. This requires the special attention of commanders and political officers to questions of the personnel's living conditions. Military builders who have been called up from the Central Asian and Transcaucasus republics are not accustomed to the severe climate conditions of our country's North and Far East. There should be constant concern for providing the military builders with warm clothing, footwear, special clothing, and mittens, and warming points for the people should be organized. And in those places where these problems are solved correctly, the efficiency of the labor of the military builders is not reduced in winter. Attention, concern, and consideration of the special features of the replacements who have arrived become an additional reserve for the improvement of matters.

When we speak of the use of the national-psychological features of the men of different nationalities in indoctrinational work, we stress the necessity to rely on everything favorable which is inherent in each people, and this means, in its representative in our ranks. Deep interest in the molding of lofty political and

moral qualities in the personnel and knowledge of the state of affairs in the collective will always permit the commander and political officer also to note in good time the negative aspects in the judgement and behavior of individual military builders of different nationalities and to help them to get rid of shortcomings.

Delving into the processes which occur in multinational troop collectives also permits the disclosure of several other special features which must be considered in indoctrinational work. We are speaking about evaluating the arriving contingent in the light of its labor tempering, religiousness, moral behavior, and adaptability under new conditions.

Youths, the majority of whom have not gone through labor tempering prior to the army, come to us. Persons who have undergone legal punishment prior to service in the army also come to us. All this requires a thoughtful approach to work with people from commanders, political officers, and all communists. In order to help them join the soldier formation rapidly, it is important to make skillful use of the assistance which the parents of the young soldier, educational institution, and enterprise or kolkhoz where he studied or worked prior to call-up to the army may render. In the interests of this, it is important to maintain close contacts with local party and Soviet organs of union and autonomous republics. This practice is acquiring ever broader propagation and is providing good results.

With the assistance of local party organs, the library holdings of the military construction units have been significantly enlarged with political and artistic literature in the languages of the Soviet peoples. Many party and Soviet organs and public organizations of the republics are rendering businesslike assistance in the selection of candidates for the military construction schools.

The social sciences departments of our schools have joined in the work on rallying the multinational collectives of military builders. In recent years, more than 10 works on the practice of indoctrinating the military builders in the spirit of the friendship of peoples have been prepared. The "Uchebnoye posobiye dlya politicheskikh zanyatiy s voyennymi stroitelyami" [Textbook for Political Lessons with Military Builders] has been received for publication. A short historical survey, "Voyennyye stroiteli Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil" [Military Builders of the Soviet Armed Forces] is being prepared. The subject of the rallying of multinational collectives found its worthy reflection in these publications.

However, much also depends on the local political organs and on their initiative and persistence in work.

Here, let us say, is the study of the Russian language. The great significance which is attached to this question is known. Recently the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee discussed the question of additional measures to improve the study of the Russian language in general-educational schools and other educational institutions of the union republics. Successes in this matter were noted and the importance of the free mastery of the Russian language along with the native language as an objective necessity and requirement of each Soviet citizen was stressed.

Under army conditions and those of the military construction units, the Russian language is a language for the training and indoctrination of the personnel and the language of orders, commands, service instructions, and construction information. The tasks of service and labor of the military builders cannot be accomplished successfully without mastering it.

Among the draftee contingent which reaches our units, those who have poor know-ledge of the Russian language or do not know it at all are encountered. Specific work is being conducted with them. One hour of the political lessons is used for the study of the Russian language. Study groups have been created in the subunits. They are headed by teachers from among the servicemen's family members. Thus, in the unit where the political officer is Lieutenant Colonel N. Tolstov two groups for the study of the Russian language have been created on a voluntary basis. Military builders are engaged in it on days off. Instruction is conducted in accordance with a program worked out by teachers of the University of Friendship of Peoples imeni P. Lumumba and a textbook for soldiers who do not master or poorly master the Russian language.

Now, there is not one military builder in the unit who does not master the Russian language. Many military builders who are occupied in groups have mastered their service duties and profession in an excellent manner and are models in labor and discipline.

Commanders, political officers, and party activists are looking for ways and means to reinforce the international indoctrination of the personnel. The task consists of working out a harmonious system everywhere for the constant improvement of the indoctrination of people in the spirit of the friendship of peoples. Such a system presumes first of all the constant concern of the political organ for the ideological-theoretical training of officer personnel in problems of the CPSU's Leninist national policy under conditions of mature socialism and trends in the development of national relations in the country as a whole and in our collectives in particular. Unfortunately, a study of the state of affairs locally shows that a considerable portion of the officers, especially of the company-detachment element, do not possess the necessary knowledge in this area and also need an improvement in teaching style. There is a requirement for the thorough training of platoon, company, and detachment commanders and party and Komsomol activists in the practice of rallying multinational collectives. We are speaking about seeing that our personnel are able to study the replacements which have arrived profoundly, distribute men of different nationalities among the subunits in the optimum manner when providing them with personnel, create activists from them, and master skills in controlling intra-collective relations.

Work in the upbringing of personnel in a spirit of fraternal friendship of peoples, just as all ideological work, does not tolerate stereotype, formalism, and window dressing and requires a creative approach. In being guided by the materials of the jubilee celebrations on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the USSR's formation and the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, it is important to make skillful use of everything which the practice of rallying multinational collectives gives us and to intensify the patriotic and international

indoctrination of the military builders. This will assist in the further mobilization of the personnel for the quality accomplishment of production tasks, the strengthening of military and labor discipline, and the strengthening of an atmosphere of friendship and comradeship in the units and subunits.

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SELF-DISCIPLINE AS LEADERSHIP ELEMENT

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[Article by Lt Col V. Perov, correspondent, KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL, "Power Over Oneself"]

[Text] What could seem to be simpler—for each of us to wield power over himself. And moreover, one who possesses power over others. It is as if logic itself prompts: if one directs a collective reliably and directs the thoughts and aspirations of dozens of people into the necessary channel, then he is required to control himself. However, at times life provides examples which fall from such a simple rule. At times, in no way are they inscribed in it. And it is not logic which is guilty here. Simply, some people do not follow it. And not only it, but the wise lines of the military regulation. And they say that all of us, the servicemen, are always required to display self—control. We note: always. On the drill field and at a conference, in the course of a training battle and when working out standards—in the most diverse circumstances with which our regular days are filled.

I encountered the following fact on recent temporary duty: several officers of one of the battalions almost received disciplinary punishment simultaneously. It was the consequence of a visit to regimental headquarters by the battalion commander. There, they indicated to him shortcomings which had been disclosed in the subunit. Returning, in turn he "indicated" to his subordinates: he meted out punishment right and left. To all, indiscriminately: to those who were right and to those who were guilty. Many supposed themselves punished only because the commander lost his self-control. And this is actually so. Otherwise, the commander would have analyzed the officers' mistakes in detail. And then, it would have been found out for sure: the errors of far from all comrades are explained by an unconscientious attitude toward the matter and some do not have enough knowledge, abilities, and experience. And this means that the degree of their guilt is also different and influence should also be exerted on them in the appropriate manner. For the characters of people are very ambiguous. For one, words are sufficient—he will remember them for years, and for another even punishment is not always useful.

Self-control, tact, and courtesy are not antipodes of demandingness. No. These concepts do not oppose one another; on the contrary--they are mutually dependent

and mean one another. The one who errs is the one who believes that the sharper the tone in a conversation, the better the subordinates will catch you and will display more zeal in service. He errs because it is not the fear of possible punishment which moves a person, but conviction and the fervent striving to do work conscientiously.

One day, I witnessed a talk by Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Volgin with a company commander. It was a confidential and benevolent conversation. It was not necessary to possess special insight to see: the company commander left the political officer inspired and attuned toward matters. However, when the door had closed behind the officer, Yuriy Fedorovich uttered without bitterness:

"We will make the communist answerable to the party."

"But you talked with him so benevolently...."

"And how else should I have talked? Shout? Be rude to him as he was to his subordinates, for which he is blamed? Then what conclusion will he draw for himself? He will only become firmly convinced of the rightness of his position. And it is necessary that he realize the opposite and experience the force of tact and benevolence for himself."

And I learned the following story from the biography of Yuriy Fedorovich.

At that time he served in another unit and in another post. The unit had just been organized and therefore it had enough administrative concerns of every type. Here, also, the commander went away on temporary duty. In general it was necessary, as they say, for Volgin to spin. Not everything turned out for him although he was in the subunits and training classrooms from morning to late in the evening and hurried about the range where equipment was installed. And the return was not as perceptible as could have been desired.

One day, a commission from higher headquarters arrived. It became familiar with the state of affairs. Volgin understood—he could not avoid hard words. The talk took place. Volgin sat, not daring to raise his head. But after two or three sharp statements a calm voice was suddenly heard. Volgin automatically raised his head and looked at the district chief of staff.

"The comrades are correct, Volgin has shortcomings," said the general. "But you see, you did not assemble only to note them. Let us think for a while on how the officer should work further. This is the main thing, our assistance."

And the talk acquired a different key. It did not become less demanding and principled. No. The shortcomings were not ignored. But they were discussed from the point of view of how to overcome them, where it is necessary to apply efforts first, and how to grab the link in order to drag out the entire chain. Listening to the advice and recommendations which were expressed in a tactful form, the officer had a deeper understanding of his errors. The requirement and readiness to correct them appeared in him.

"I extracted much from that conversation," recalls Yuriy Fedorovich. "In the area of the ability to organize work—it goes without saying. But especially

concerning how important it is for the leader to create a situation of goodwill and courtesy in the name of the interests of the matter and to maintain a healthy microclimate.

It is difficult not to agree with this. Back in ancient times, a wise man noted: "With the aid of tact, success can be attained even in those cases where nothing can be done with the use of force." And again: tact is correctly called the reason of the heart. It is believed, not without justification. For the moral atmosphere in the collective depends to a certain degree on good breeding and courtesy in people's treatment of one another. Each of us is called upon to maintain it and to be restrained and tactful regardless of service status. By the way, a higher service status imposes on a person even higher responsibility for the moral consequences of deeds. "The force of the communist's moral example, especially of a communist-leader, is great. He is always visible among the masses, and the higher the post which he occupies, the greater the responsibility which lies on him. Serious dangers and failures lie in wait for those who forget about this and who are affected by a kind of 'altitude sickness'," it was stressed at the June (1983) plenum of the party Central Committee.

"...Just how does this happen?" asked a platoon leader in a talk with a political officer who advised him to display more tact and self-control in relations with subordinates. "A soldier violated discipline, and we are required to patchim on the back, so to speak, and be courteous with him?"

"Courteous, and only courteous," answered the political officer.

Courtesy is not joking around. Courtesy is an active and energetic concept. Of course, it has no right to conflict with the truth, otherwise it becomes unprincipledness, the very thing which is not far from familiarity and forgiveness. For already the very contact between the communist-leader and people should play an indoctrinational role. The example of the relations of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin with his comrades in the revolutionary struggle is a striking illustration of this. In the presence of Lenin, recall his contemporaries, an atmosphere of purity and enthusiasm was created without any visible efforts on his part and without any moral admonitions. Obviously, it turned out that any coarseness or empty and, what is more, trite word were out of place where he was. People automatically submitted to his irresistible charm, were braced internally, and they wanted to be better. It was as if the reflection from the fire which flamed in him fell on them. Lenin's personal example and his moral influence protected the people who associated with him against arrogance, self-conceit, and coarseness and instilled moral culture.

"The political leader," noted V. I. Lenin, "is responsible not only for how he leads, but also for what those whom he leads do." In fact, it is difficult to call a chief a person of high culture if you see how fussy and obsequeous his subordinates are with him and, in relations with one another, to put it mildly, they deviate from the elementary norms of tact and courtesy. How can one not recall here the truth proven by life: the echo responds to the call.

Interesting in this regard are the letters which arrive in the unit where officer V. Silant'yev serves. Letters of thanks and letters of confession from men who

have been released to the reserve. I will present extracts from two. "I am now far from you, my army friends," reports Junior Sergeant (reserve) D. Gafurov, "but, as formerly, my heart is with you. I am working at a construction site as a brigade leader of concrete workers. I will say directly, at times it is difficult. Oh, how difficult. And dirt, and slush, and night shifts and sometimes stoppages with the concrete, and not everyone in the brigade conforms to discipline--anything can happen. You know, sometimes it seems as if my nerves have reached their limit, I feel as though I'm just about to fail, and say vile things to people because I am furious, because order is not being maintained, and here I remember my company, and my heart calms down. I recall you, fellows. Our commander--Senior Lieutenant Silant'yev, the political deputy--Senior Lieutenant Serednichenko, and the first sergeant--Warrant Officer [praporshchik] Akif'yev, who we first undeservedly resented for what seemed to us to be faultfinding. I recall how they patiently nursed us and how wisely they exhorted us. They exhorted us not by shouting and not by coarseness, but by reasonable demandingness. And if they reproached us for something, they pointed out the errors, but it was without a shadow of superiority over you. And so, when I think of what army service gave me besides the profession of concrete worker and besides how to overcome difficulties clenching one's teeth, I invariably come to the conclusion: the ability to live in a collective and to be restrained and courteous when handling people. And this helps me greatly as a brigade leader."

And only several lines from the letter of Private (reserve) A. Dunayev, now a student in a pedagogical institute. "In the army," writes the former soldier to the deputy battalion commander for political affairs, "I, Petr Leont'yevich, passed through the school of courage, and the school of indoctrination, and the school of good breeding and the mutual respect of man for man. The example of my commanders and political officers whose deeds were always distinguished by a high style of mutual relations played an important role in my selection of the profession of teacher. For me, they were and remain a model for imitation. I hope that with time my future pupils can feel and say something similar about me."

And it becomes clear why the battalion in which the authors of the quoted letters served is in good repute. Here concern for professional training and firm discipline is based on the rich soil of healthy moral relations between the men. And in this the tone is set first of all by the leaders of the collective, demanding and tactful people who are able to demand strictly and benevolently.

In short, self-control seems to be a personal problem only at first glance. It is one of those problems where the personal is inseparable from the public, for each of us lives in a collective and comes in contact with a great number of people every day. And we ourselves as well as those with whom we meet and are making common cause hand in hand are quite concerned about how and with what perhaps even hastily cast words are answered. They encourage or force one to droop, they cause a good burst in work or they spoil the attitude. Do we always ponder over the moral damage which is inflicted by a phrase which has a sharp sound and is hurled at someone? Cross our hearts, we admit, not always. And the pity is that someone is sincerely mistaken in explaining the same coarseness and shouting by demandingness as required by the regulations and firmness of character. The following case is recalled.

A comfortable military post. Two roads lead from the training classrooms to the soldiers' barracks. Major Yevgeniy Petrovich Li and I stood on the one over which the subunits usually returned from lessons. And really, the route along it was shorter. The officer shared his impressions of the firings which had taken place the day before and himself glanced in the direction of the training building from time to time. The lessons had ended there. The soldiers formed up and platoon after platoon, with measured step, approached the road intersection. And here, lingering for an instant, the commanders, as if it had been arranged, led the subunits away along the circuitous road, passing the one which was shorter. Major Li grinned:

"Aha, they are afraid..." and, noticing our bewilderment, he explained: "They are afraid of me. I am strict with them, I give them no quarter for blunders."

Later one of the deputy platoon leaders, not wishing to appear in the presence of the chief once again, said more precisely:

"It is not strictness which scares us away. Who wants to hear a reprimand with and without a reason..."

Nevertheless, although it happens infrequently those are encountered for whom the role of an "awesome" leader who "frightens" with his appearance is alluring. Such comrades find satisfaction in the fact that in their presence their associates feel suppressed and do not dare to raise their eyes, and this even tickles the leader's vanity. They say, they respect me, and I, it means, command their respect. Alas, a sad delusion.

And then, when the officer bragged of his "strictness," the secretary of the party committee who was standing next to us said to Major Li with bitterness:

"You are not proud of this, Yevgeniy Petrovich. Not of this. Evidently, you do not profit from science."

Restraint, tactfulness, and respectfulness toward one's associates, if they became the essence of a person's character and the standard of his conduct, will be manifested in any situations. And if courtesy is selective, then it is early to speak of good breeding. Look: another comrade—courtesy itself. He is refined in his manners, considerate, and tactful. And it is as if it is only satisfaction to rub shoulders with him. However, only in the case where you are senior in rank and service status or equal. In contact with others of lower rank, however, at times some metamorphosis occurs in such a comrade. And it was necessary to be convinced of this.

One day, in the office of the regimental commander I conversed with its smiling and pleasant master. His smooth, soft voice murmured like a streamlet. I, naturally, could not think that such a pleasant urbanity was due not to me as a person, but to the organ of the military press which I represent, and I took it as the commander's customary manner of sociability. I admit, a liking for him automatically arose. But it was soon dissipated. And in a most unforeseen manner. There was a knock on the door of the commander's office and a young officer entered.

"What do you want?" and metal could be heard in the voice of the host. He interrupted the officer who had begun to explain the essence of the matter. "Really, didn't you see that I am busy, perhaps you can report a little later. Go," and the host of the office expressively showed him the door.

And somehow it suddenly became uncomfortable for both of us. Our conversation flagged, as they say, and got out of the accustomed channel. The officer also sensed this himself and, evidently, to smooth over the unpleasant aftertaste from the situation which had arisen, he said:

"All day long your nerves are overstrained, and here they still distract you with all kinds of trifles."

It should be thought that it only remained for me to sympathize a little with his commanders'concerns. For really and truly, he has them to excess. However, this also contains the art of contact with people, genuine contact, and not ostentatious courtesy, and such circumstances by no means have the right to exert influence on them. The dichotomy in the moral makeup, where it is difficult to make out where the mask is and where the true face of a person is, cannot be a secret for long. For sooner or later, the leader himself will also begin to sense that the ostentatious charm which is intended for some and the ostentatious "firmness of character" addressed to others do not arouse respect for him from either side. The path to authority is unthinkable without a clearly selected position and a lofty style of intercourse with all and everyone taken separately. Regardless of who they are—your commanders or your subordinates.

In connection with this, let us turn once again to Lenin. The observations of L. A. Fotiyeva are interesting. Here is what she writes about Vladimir Il'ich: "He especially considered it vile and unworthy of each Soviet person, all the more a communist, to be coarse and discourteous with the one who stands lower in status and therefore does not dare to answer."

It cannot be said that this rule is unknown to any of us. The home, and the school, and the military school instill lofty moral qualities in the future officer and teach him to be courteous and well-mannered and to value proper pride in himself and others. And respect for the one who values his dignity highly is great in each of us. Dozens and hundreds of examples can be presented on this score. As a rule, such communists possess ideological integrity and devotion to principle and are able to evaluate one or another situation from profound party positions and to emerge from it in any case in a worthy manner, as becomes a communist. To emerge without abasing the dignity of another and without shaking his own.

I remember service under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Valentin Alekseyevich Kuznetsov. Much was favorable for this officer. His reasonable demandingness and tact, party exactingness and heartful generosity. Each contact with Valentin Alekseyevich taught us something and enriched us morally in some way.

A party meeting was under way. Criticizing individual shortcomings in the subunit, one of the speakers, by the way Kuznetsov's subordinate, clearly overdid it in an outburst and did not repress his emotions. He said too much about Kuznetsov, accusing him of what, in principle, he had nothing to do with. From experience I know that sometimes, in such situations, the one being criticized assumes a pose since he endures undeserved offense and a mutual quarrel flares up. But Valentin Alekseyevich was not like this. In his speech which was in good form no ambitious notes were sensed. Most likely the preceding speaker, he said calmly and kindly, is not completely informed about the state of things and about the reasons for the gaps on the sector of work which had been mentioned. And Kuznetsov spoke of them. The critic, understanding that he had exaggerated from the rostrum became embarrassed and later, in the circle of his comrades, he admitted that his fervor was inappropriate. And for us, this case became one more object lesson of how one should spare the dignity of a person who simply shook it himself with a rash step and lack of restraint.

Of course, one should always oppose a lack of objectivity, coarseness, and a lack of restraint. However, not with those procedures and means! It is namely in this way that communist Valentin Alekseyevich Kuznetsov proceeded in each necessary case. Honestly, we envied him with all our hearts and...learned from him.

In the units and subunits, many really interesting measures are conducted which are directed toward instilling in the personnel courtesy and tact in dealing with one another. Nor do the party organizations avoid such questions. But the trouble is that the conversation takes place now and then, expressing it figuratively, by and large. More rarely do we try to find out the reasons for moral failures and we do not analyze the specific situations in which they occur. But you see, the preference of one or another comrade for suspiciousness, coarseness, and a lack of objectivity begins at times, it would seem, with something small. Sometimes one flash of resentment may cause a protracted conflict. Here is where the party organization should be as attentive, wise, and principled as possible.

At one time Captain A. Gurov and Major N. Rostovykh found themselves in disgrace with officer A. Taradin. Taradin gave them a good scolding at every convenient chance. Although it seemed as though there were no special reasons. Gurov, as was learned from a conversation with the secretary of the party commission with the unit political department, is a conscientious officer. Rostovykh is also described favorably as regards service. Then what was the matter? The matter was that communists Gurov and Rostovykh spoke at a party meeting. One of them expressed concern that the field refuelling points were not properly equipped, there is free access to them, the equipment is refuelled with buckets, and no record of fuel consumption is kept. Communist Rostovykh also shared his problems which were awaiting urgent solutions. Taradin perceived the presentations of both party members as an attack upon him and as encroachment on authority. And emotions began to seethe. And a thirst for vengeance cast its spell. Despite the interests of the matter, a nervous situation set in in the unit headquarters.

Of course, disagreements are possible between people in a collective. It is completely proper when opinions cross in the name of restoring the truth. In addition, it is correctly considered that rarely is it so difficult to display the good aspects of one's nature in something as in a polemic and in the criticism of others. And in comradely arguments at the same meetings, in taking cognizance of false tact we cannot smooth over the acuteness of problems. This is not in the rules of communists. I admit that in order to disclose their essence more completely and to ascertain the positions of communists more clearly we can and

should specially emphasize questions and smash the arguments of the opponents in a principled manner and by weighty arguments but in so doing even an easily vulnerable, extremely punctilious person should not feel humiliation. And then, it is believed, with all this a common point of view on a debatable problem will be worked out and the meeting itself will be a school of party ethics.

Its due should be given to the party organization. It was able to put in place the needed stresses in the conflict which arose. Taradin was given to understand unambiguously that he was wrong. Unfortunately, after all that occurred the author of these lines was unable to speak with Anatoliy Ivanovich, but he very much hopes that he (by the way, a good organizer and a specialist who knows his business profoundly) understood the main thing: the communist-leader is not honored by a depraved style where petty offenses are regarded as of paramount importance and where instead of truth and the struggle for its attainment vindictiveness and rancor prevail, make themselves felt, and hinder work.

It is good when a communist is corrected in such cases. But it is a different question. Conflicts of this type would not have to take place at all if an atmosphere of demandingness and mutual exactingness reigned in each collective, where the party organization would give battle in their very incipiency to manifestations of moral defects and pettiness and molded in people such a quality as the ability to get rid of a personal attitude of mind, personal sympathies and antipathies, and everything superficial and which hinders the common cause in their opinions and actions.

But I do not greatly believe that the inclinations of one or another comrade to straighten someone out coarsely, to "correct" someone with a shout, or to "keep an eye" on someone due to intractability are not noted immediately and suddenly. I am convinced that they are noted. The collective is a sensitive organism. The authority of a post is not fenced off from it by a screen. And all the more since any service status does not serve as justification for ill breeding or seeking to forget the elementary style of intercourse. Of course, the collective notices everything. It is only that, you see, we often are very condescending toward ethical "errors" in the behavior of a person. They say, well, he does not have enough self-control so we won't execute him for this. In addition, both allowances for youth and for inexperience are permitted. Life, they say, breaks them in and will teach. Life, of course, will teach. And later only bitter lessons must be extracted from it by not only the one who at one time showed mercy, but also by the collective itself.

...To be able to wield power over oneself. This, in general, is both simple and extremely necessary, but simple only for a well-bred person. Such moral qualities as self-control, tact, and courtesy are acquiring special significance in our time. "...The party sees," noted Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov at the June (1983) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, "that we bring up a person not simply as a bearer of a certain sum of knowledge, but first of all--as a citizen of a socialist society and an active builder of communism with the ideological lines, morals, and lofty style of labor and behavior inherent in him."

One can hardly instill within himself a personality, conflicting with self-control, tact, and the generally accepted norms of mutual relations.

Everything is within the power of a person if he is industrious, obsessed, and purposeful: successes in service and successes in life. Everything is within his power. However, under the condition: if he has power over himself.

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